---
order: 1
summary: Self-generated keypairs, one-time enrolment, 24-hour certificates, and what
  an identity string means.
title: Identity
path: concepts/identity
status: published
---

# Identity

Every participant in a Proxility fabric — connector, workload, human — has an
identity it can prove cryptographically. Policy is written about these
identities, so understanding them is the prerequisite for everything else.

## The identity string

```
prox://<tenant>/<realm>/<name>
```

For example `prox://acme/prod/payments`. The tenant and realm come from your
organisation's structure (see
[Tenants and realms](/docs/proxility/concepts/tenancy)); the name is yours to
choose and must be unique inside the realm.

The identity appears as a URI SAN in the participant's certificate. It is the
only thing policy matches on. IP addresses never appear in a rule.

## Enrolment

A participant's private key is generated **on the participant**, during
enrolment, and never transmitted. What travels is a one-time **enrolment
token**:

1. An operator with `connector:create` in the realm issues a token. It is
   single-use and expires in 60 minutes by default.
2. The connector generates an Ed25519 keypair locally.
3. It presents the token plus a certificate request to the enrolment endpoint.
4. The Proxility CA issues a certificate binding the public key to the
   identity. The token is burned.

A leaked token is a real problem for its 60-minute window — it lets an attacker
enrol *a* connector under that name. It is not a key, so it cannot decrypt
anything, and burning it on first use means a race is detectable: the legitimate
enrolment fails loudly. Keep tokens in ScaiVault rather than in a shell history
or a ticket.

## Certificate lifetime

| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Algorithm | Ed25519 |
| Lifetime | 24 hours |
| Renewal | Automatic, attempted at 8 hours remaining |
| Revocation | Immediate — the edge refuses the identity on next handshake |

Short lifetimes are the point. A compromised host stops being useful to an
attacker within a day without anyone running a revocation process, and
revocation when you *do* run it takes effect at the next handshake rather than
waiting for a CRL to propagate.

## Workload identity

A connector can issue identities to workloads behind it, so policy can be
written about a specific service rather than about the whole network the
connector fronts. Two mechanisms:

- **Attested** — the connector verifies the workload against the local
  platform (systemd unit, Kubernetes service account, cloud instance identity
  document) and requests a derived certificate for it.
- **Delegated** — the connector treats a local address and port as a named
  workload. Weaker: anything that can reach that address locally inherits the
  identity. Use attested identity where the platform supports it.

## Human identity

Console and CLI authentication is delegated to **ScaiKey**. A human session
yields a short-lived identity of the form `prox://acme/prod/user:alice`, which
policy can name directly — useful for giving one person access to one internal
application without a VPN client.

## What identity does not do

Identity answers *who is this*. It says nothing about *may they*. That is
[Policy](/docs/proxility/concepts/policy), evaluated separately on every single
connection.
