---
order: 1
summary: 'Zero-trust connectivity: mutually authenticated, end-to-end encrypted links
  between customer networks, cloud networks and partner estates.'
title: Proxility
path: index
status: published
---

# Proxility

Proxility is the ScaiLabs **zero-trust connectivity service**. It joins
networks that have no business trusting each other — a customer data centre, a
cloud VPC, a branch office, a partner's estate — into a single, policy-governed
fabric where every connection is mutually authenticated, end-to-end encrypted,
and allowed only because a rule says so.

> This namespace is freshly bootstrapped. The pages below are the starting
> skeleton written at registration; the Proxility team owns them from here and
> should correct anything that drifts from the shipped product.

## The short version

You install a **connector** in each network you want to join. Connectors dial
*out* to the Proxility edge, so you open no inbound ports and expose no public
addresses. Each connector holds a cryptographic identity it generated itself.
Traffic between two connectors is encrypted end to end — the edge relays
ciphertext it cannot read. Nothing is reachable until a policy names it.

```
  customer DC                  Proxility edge                  cloud VPC
  ┌──────────────┐                                         ┌──────────────┐
  │  connector   │ ──── outbound, mTLS ────▶  ◀──── outbound, mTLS ──── │  connector   │
  │  acme/dc1    │                  (relays ciphertext)                 │  acme/aws-prod│
  └──────┬───────┘                                         └───────┬──────┘
         │ local reach only                                        │
   10.20.0.0/16                                             172.31.0.0/16
```

## What Proxility provides

- **No implicit trust.** Being on the network grants nothing. Every flow is
  authorised per connection against policy, at both ends.
- **Identity, not addresses.** Policy is written about workload identities
  (`prox://acme/prod/payments`), not IP ranges that change under you.
- **End-to-end encryption.** Sessions are encrypted between the two
  connectors. The edge forwards ciphertext and holds no session keys.
- **Outbound-only deployment.** Connectors need egress to the edge. No inbound
  firewall rules, no NAT traversal games, no public IPs on your estate.
- **Short-lived credentials.** Identity certificates live 24 hours and renew
  automatically, so a stolen credential expires on its own.
- **Published services, not flat networks.** A connector exposes named
  services rather than joining two subnets together, so a compromise on one
  side does not inherit the other side's reachability.
- **Complete decision log.** Every allow and every deny is an event, with the
  identity, service and rule that decided it, forwarded to ScaiLog.

## Where it fits

Proxility is a **platform primitive**, like Storey for objects and Scuttle for
relational state. Other ScaiLabs products reach private customer estates
through it rather than building their own tunnels:

| Product | How it uses Proxility |
|---|---|
| ScaiKey | User and service identity for console and user-to-service access |
| ScaiVault | Custody of enrolment tokens and connector bootstrap material |
| ScaiLog | Destination for connection decision and audit events |
| ScaiSentry | Alerting on connector health and policy-deny spikes |
| ScaiControl | Where the Proxility console is surfaced |

## Start here

| If you are… | Read |
|---|---|
| Joining your first network | [Quickstart](/docs/proxility/quickstart) |
| Deciding whether it fits | [Overview](/docs/proxility/overview) |
| Designing a policy model | [Policy](/docs/proxility/concepts/policy) |
| Reviewing the cryptography | [Cryptography](/docs/proxility/concepts/cryptography) |
| Automating it | [API](/docs/proxility/reference/api) · [CLI](/docs/proxility/reference/cli) |

## On "military grade"

The phrase appears in Proxility marketing copy. In these docs it means one
specific thing: the primitives and key lifetimes listed in
[Cryptography](/docs/proxility/concepts/cryptography), chosen to stay sound
against a future quantum adversary recording traffic today. It is not a claim
about a completed external evaluation. Where a formal validation or audit is
still outstanding, the table below says so.

## Status

| Item | State |
|---|---|
| Namespace bootstrapped | done |
| Connector builds on /downloads | pending |
| Control API v1 | pending |
| Independent cryptographic audit | pending |
| FIPS-validated build | pending |
| Common Criteria evaluation | not started |
| ScaiLog event forwarding | pending |

Correct this table as the real thing ships — an outdated status table is worse
than no status table.
