---
summary: Agents use ScaiGit through MCP; every tool has a risk tier, and tiers decide
  who may call it and when a person must approve.
title: Agents and risk tiers
path: concepts/agents
status: published
---

# Agents and risk tiers

AI agents use ScaiGit through its Model Context Protocol (MCP) interface, a
set of tools such as "list pull requests", "create a commit" or "merge a pull
request". Agents never get direct access to the forge. Every call goes
through one gateway that checks who is calling, how risky the action is,
whether a person must approve it, and records it in ScaiLog.

## Risk tiers

Every tool has a tier, fixed in ScaiGit itself:

| Tier | Meaning | Default rule |
|---|---|---|
| **T0** | Read only, no side effects | Allowed for anyone signed in, on what they can see |
| **T1** | Reversible writes | Allowed for roles that list it |
| **T2** | Consequential writes | As T1; an agent acting on its own needs a person's approval |
| **T3** | Destructive or administrative | Always needs a person's approval; agents only on behalf of a person |

An organisation's policy can **raise** a tool's tier, never lower it. A few
tools change tier with their arguments: a draft pull request counts as T1,
and deleting a protected branch or merging past required checks counts as T3.
The [tool reference](/docs/scaigit/reference/mcp-tools) lists every tool with
its tier.

## Who is calling

- **A person**, signed in with ScaiKey (for example through an assistant in
  their editor). Calls act with that person's own rights.
- **An agent on behalf of a person.** The agent exchanges the person's
  ScaiKey token for one that names both of them; ScaiGit applies the
  person's rights and records the agent as the actor.
- **A service agent** acting on its own, with its own ScaiKey application.
  It gets the rights its role in the policy grants.

## Human approval

When a call needs approval, it is suspended, not refused. The request
appears on the **Approvals** page of the console for the people allowed to
review it, with the repository, the tool, its tier, the rule that required
approval and the arguments. They approve or deny under their own identity.
If nobody decides within 30 minutes, the call fails with `hitl_timeout`.
Pending requests survive restarts.

Agent reviews of pull requests are comments by default: an agent's
"approve" is recorded as a comment and labelled, so it never counts as a
human approval for branch protection.

## Audit

Every call — allowed, denied, approved or timed out — is recorded in ScaiLog
under your organisation, with the caller, the acting agent, the tool, the
tier and the outcome. Tool arguments are not kept in the audit trail.
