Cryptography
This page is the honest version of "military grade". It lists what Proxility uses, how long keys live, and what each component can see.
Primitives#
| Layer | Primitive |
|---|---|
| Participant identity | Ed25519 |
| Certificate issuance | Proxility CA, Ed25519, 24-hour leaf validity |
| Session handshake | Noise IK |
| Key agreement | X25519 and ML-KEM-768, hybrid — both must succeed |
| Bulk encryption | ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD) |
| Transcript hashing | SHA-512 |
| Connector ↔ edge channel | TLS 1.3, mutually authenticated, as an outer wrapper |
The key agreement is hybrid on purpose. X25519 alone is sound against today's adversaries but not against one who records traffic now and decrypts it after a quantum computer arrives. ML-KEM-768 covers that case; combining both means a break in either one alone does not expose the session.
Key lifetimes#
| Key | Lifetime |
|---|---|
| Identity private key | Life of the host. Generated locally, never transmitted |
| Identity certificate | 24 hours, renewed at 8 hours remaining |
| Session keys | Rekeyed every 15 minutes or 4 GiB, whichever comes first |
| Enrolment token | 60 minutes, single use |
Sessions are forward secret: recovering a host's identity key later does not decrypt traffic captured earlier, because session keys come from ephemeral agreement and are discarded on rekey.
What each component can see#
This is the part worth being exact about.
| Component | Sees |
|---|---|
| Origin connector | Plaintext, because it is one endpoint |
| Destination connector | Plaintext, because it is the other endpoint |
| Proxility edge | Ciphertext, plus metadata: the two identities, the service name, byte counts, timestamps |
| ScaiLabs operators | What the edge sees. Not session contents |
The edge cannot decrypt a session. It holds no session keys; the keys are agreed directly between the two connectors inside the relayed stream. What the edge does hold is metadata, and metadata is not nothing — who talked to what, when, and how much is visible to the edge and appears in the decision log. If your threat model excludes ScaiLabs from seeing that metadata, Proxility in its hosted form is not the right deployment; ask about a dedicated edge.
Your own application-layer TLS passes through untouched. Proxility does not terminate, inspect or re-sign it, so end-to-end TLS to your service remains end-to-end.
Implementation#
The data plane uses established implementations rather than bespoke cryptography. Primitive choices follow current public guidance on post-quantum migration — hybrid key agreement now, rather than a flag day later.
What has not happened yet#
Stated plainly, because a security product that is vague here does not deserve trust:
| Item | State |
|---|---|
| Independent cryptographic audit | Not yet commissioned |
| FIPS 140-3 validated build | Not available |
| Common Criteria evaluation | Not started |
| Published threat model | Pending |
Do not represent Proxility as certified or accredited while this table says otherwise. Update it the moment any line changes — and update the marketing copy at the same time.